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Abstract 
While the literature on consumption insurance is growing fast, little research has been 
conducted on how rural consumption insurance is affected by democracy.  In this paper 
we examine how consumption insurance of Chinese rural residents is affected by whether 
the local leader is democratically elected.  Exploring a unique panel data set of 1400 
households from 1987 to 2002, we find that consumption insurance is more complete 
when the households live in villages with elected village leaders. Furthermore, 
democracy improves consumption insurance only for the poor and the middle-income 
farmers, but not for the rich.  These findings underline the importance of democratic 
governance for ensuring better rural consumption insurance and poverty reduction. 
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  Rural residents in developing countries face substantial income risks such as 
weather shocks and technological changes.  Economists have long investigated the extent 
of such risks, how to deal with them, the extent to which consumption is insured, and 
what mechanisms are available for consumption insurance (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; 
Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994, 1995; Morduch, 1995; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).  They 
find that risks are widespread in developing countries, that consumption insurance is 
incomplete, and that local communities play a significant role in providing consumption 
insurance.  Townsend (1994) and Jalan and Ravallion (1999), for example, find that 
richer residents are better insured in their consumption.  Townsend (1994) finds that 
consumption insurance depends on occupation: entrepreneurs in rural Thailand are less 
insured than people of other occupations.  Health status is also found to affect 
consumption insurance (Townsend, 1994; Gertler and Gruber, 2002), along with the 
access to microfinance programs (Gertler, Levine and Moretti, 2001).   To summarize, 
the existing literature on the determinants of consumption insurance has found that 
consumption insurance tends to be more complete for households with more physical and 
health assets and with access to microfinance programs. 
  Most of the existing literature on consumption insurance concerns the private 
means of providing consumption insurance, i.e., through household asset holding, health, 
or changes in labor supply.  However, another important way to attain consumption 
insurance is through social provision.  Village residents could rely on governance 
mechanisms within the village to attain better consumption insurance.  Given the large 
risks faced by rural residents, most villagers, including the poor and the middle-income 
farmers, should benefit from such insurance provision. Whether and how much 
consumption insurance is provided clearly depend on the details of governance within the 
community.  One noteworthy detail of governance is whether local leaders are 
democratically elected.  Presumably elected village leaders in China should have stronger 
incentives to satisfy local residents relative to appointed village leaders, who are more 
accountable to the upper level of government and may instead care more about goals such 
as paying taxes, finishing family planning requirements and delivering grain quota (Lin et 
al., 2003).  Would democracy affect the provision of consumption insurance? Who would   3
be the main beneficiary of elections in terms of insurance against adverse shocks?  The 
median voter theorem suggests that elections would lead to policies that favor the median 
voters.  If the median voters' demand for consumption insurance is not satisfied under 
non-democracy--a scenario we expect given the significant lack of consumption 
insurance for the majority of rural residents (Townsend, 1995)--there is a good reason to 
expect that elections would improve consumption insurance for the median voters and the 
poor.   
  In this paper we use a unique panel data set of Chinese households to investigate 
how consumption insurance depends on whether village leaders are elected, and whether 
the insurance effect differ for the rich, the middle-income earners and the poor.  The data 
set covers approximately 1400 households in 49 villages of eight Chinese provinces from 
1987 to 2002, and has detailed information on consumption, income, household 
characteristics, and a number of village characteristics.  Particularly interesting is that we 
supplement the existing data with our own survey of village characteristics including 
information on village elections.  During the sample period, Chinese governments and 
our villages began to implement village elections, and due to the experimental and 
decentralized nature of Chinese reforms, there are both time series and cross sectional 
variations in the timing of elections, thus offering nice variations in village elections for 
our sample.  While the implementation of elections is potentially endogenous to the 
levels of consumption, we find no evidence that the election is endogenous to the growth 
of consumption by using a set of plausible instrumental variables. Moreover, we note that 
a subset of our provinces implemented elections on a relatively rapid pace and elections 
in such provinces are likely to be less selective.  This sub-sample allows us to investigate 
the robustness of the effects of elections on consumption insurance.    
  Our investigation suggests that rural residents are better insured in consumption 
when their villages are governed by elected leaders. Furthermore, democracy improves 
consumption insurance the most for the poor and the middle-income earners. We find no 
evidence that elections are endogenous with respect to consumption growth.  Besides, we 
obtain similar results when using the subsample of the provinces that rapidly 
implemented elections within a province, a subsample that the selectivity of elections    4
should be less serious.  The qualitative results are also similar when the election is treated 
as endogenous.   
  Our paper is related to two strands of literature.  The first is the consumption 
insurance literature.  Previous literature has focused on examining how the degree of 
consumption insurance is determined by private means such as health, wealth and labor 
supply.  A few exceptions look at how consumption insurance is affected by the access to 
microfinance programs.  To our knowledge, there has been no research that has examined 
how consumption insurance is affected by democracy and governance.  Second, our 
paper is related to the recent empirical microeconomic literature investigating the effects 
of elections and governance on economic outcomes.  Zhang et al. (2004), for example, 
offer evidence that elections in Chinese villages in the 1990s led to reduced tax burdens 
for villagers and improvements in the allocation of public expenditures.  Besley and 
Burgess (2002) show that better information and active electorate improves government 
responsiveness.  Besley and Coate (2003) find that states with elected regulators tend to 
be more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies (relative to appointed  regulators).    
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) find that democratization in Indian villages tends to give 
the poor, landless farmers more voice in the provision of public goods, and improve their 
welfare and reduce poverty.  Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) use a randomized policy 
experiment in India to show that women leaders tend to invest more in infrastructure that 
is directly relevant to the needs of their own gender.  All of these papers suggest that 
elections tend to have beneficial effects in improving public expenditure or reducing 
poverty, but none deals with the issue of how democracy affects consumption insurance. 
  In the rest of the paper, we first offer a conceptual framework to discuss how 
consumption smoothing might be affected by democracy in section II.  We then introduce 
our data and discuss the measurements for our empirical investigation in section III.  We 
present the findings in section IV, and conclude in section V. 
 
II. Conceptual  Framework 
   The framework for testing consumption insurance is fully developed and used to 
test for consumption insurance in developing countries by Deaton (1992) and Townsend   5
(1994).
1  The framework can be derived from the central planner maximizing a social 
welfare function of the households to allocate resources under uncertainty in a 
community.  If we assume CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility function, we can 
derive the following testable specification from the first order condition of the 
optimization problem: 
    ∑ = + + Δ = Δ
V
j ivt jvt j ivt ivt y b c
1 ln ln ε δ γ     (1),   
where i, v and t stand for household, community and year, respectively.  c refers to 
consumption per household member, y income per household member, and Δ means first 
differencing.
2   V  is the number of communities in our sample.  jvt δ  is  a  village-year 
dummy variable that is one when j is v and the year is t, and zero otherwise.  The 
equation thus represents a regression of the growth of consumption per household 
member onto the growth of income per household member and a set of community-year 
dummies.   
  The magnitude of the coefficient for the percentage change of income, b, has 
major implications for consumption insurance.  If b is not significantly different from 
zero and the community-year dummies are jointly significant, changes in household 
consumption is then completely determined by changes in community-year aggregate 
resources, which implies complete household consumption insurance.  If b  is 
significantly different from zero, and the community-year dummies are jointly 
insignificant, then there is no risk sharing within the community, and consumption is a 
pure household behavior.  If b is significantly different from zero, but the community-
year dummies are also jointly significant, then there is some but nevertheless imperfect 
risk sharing within the community.  A larger b means less consumption insurance offered 
by various arrangements within the community. 
  To accommodate other factors not explicitly modeled in our framework, we also 
control for changes in household characteristics,  X Δ , which include changes in 
household size, in the number of old residents in the household (i.e., 60 years old and 
                                                 
1   In addition, Grimard (1997) finds evidence of risk sharing among ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivoire.  
Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) test consumption insurance in developed countries.   
2   Other functional form assumptions of the utility function could lead to a linear specification, 
which we have also tried in empirical explorations.  For simplicity, we adopt the more widely-used form of 
the log linear specification.   6
beyond), and in the number of children (i.e., 15 years old or younger).  Specified in this 
way, the specification becomes a fixed-effect specification, and allows for changes in 
household structure to directly affect changes in consumption. It is also plausible that X 
may enter into the equation in levels. The household size captures economy of scale in 
household production, which may affect consumption growth.  The demographic 
structure of a household may also imply a different preference for consumption and 
therefore the rate of consumption growth. We thus will also run a specification in which 
household characteristics enter in levels.  In general we find that it makes little 
differences for our key parameters whether we include X or X Δ .  For ease in specification, 
we shall adopt the base specification in which  X Δ  is controlled for. Equation (1) is then 
augmented as follows: 
   ∑ = + Δ + + Δ = Δ
V
j ivt jvt j ivt ivt X y b c
1
' ln ln ε α δ γ .    (2)   
  Some may be concerned that the household structure may be endogenous.  For 
instance, adverse shocks may lead to the reduction in household size by inducing some 
family members to migrate.  To check the sensitivity of our results to the endogeneity of 
either the levels or the changes in family structure, we also report results without 
including the household characteristics variables.  The results tend out to be very similar, 
and the endogeneity of X or  X Δ  is therefore not a major concern.   
  Now suppose the election, denoted E and is a dummy variable, may affect both 
consumption growth and consumption insurance. We thus modify (2) as follows: 
  ∑ = + Δ + + + ⋅ Δ + Δ = Δ
V
j ivt jvt j r ivt ivt ivt X E E y y b c
1
' ln ln ln ε α δ γ α β . (3) 
The direct effect of elections on consumption growth is captured by the term αrE. The 
degree of consumption insurance is then characterized by b+ βE.  A negative β then 
means that consumption insurance improves where elections occur.      
  The governance structure of villages should matter for consumption insurance.  
Since the 1980s the Chinese government experimented and allowed village elections in 
tens of thousands of villages. Elections would make village leaders more accountable to 
village residents' needs.  The simplest model of democracy, the median voter theorem, 
predicts that the onset of democracy would provide incentives for the leaders to deliver 
what the median village residents need.  Indeed, this is consistent with recent micro   7
evidence, which shows that elections tilt government behavior toward the interests of 
local constituents (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Coate, 2003; Zhang et al., 2004; 
Wang and Yao, 2006).   
  Since poor rural residents bear an enormous amount of risks, and the majority of 
rural residents face incomplete insurance for their consumptions (Townsend, 1995), it is 
plausible that the median residents and the poor would demand subsidies in various ways 
when adverse shocks occur, or would demand investment in infrastructure that would 
benefit the median and the poor residents disproportionately to cushion the impact of 
adverse shocks.  For example, they can demand village leader candidates to provide 
community-subsidized healthcare, micro finance at the community level, temporary loans 
when their crops die due to idiosyncratic shocks, and food subsidy when farmers lose 
their capacity for work.  Under village democracy, the chance of being re-elected as 
village leaders would depend on whether the median residents' demands are met, and this 
gives the elected leaders a stronger incentive to provide such subsidies than in the case of 
appointed leaders.  Moreover, elections give the local constituents chances to select 
leaders with better ability and public service orientation, which increases the chance of 
pushing through the policies that favor the median and poor residents (Besley, 2005).  
Finally, even the rich residents have incentives to support the improvement in 
consumption insurance for the relatively poor.  The reason is that the rich tend to suffer 
from negative externality when the poor and the median residents do not have good 
consumption insurance--the relatively poor tend to borrow from the rich within the same 
village in case of adverse shocks, and such norms-enforced lending tends to reduce the 
welfare of the rich.  The rich residents therefore also tend to support policy initiatives to 
help the majority of residents to have better consumption insurance.  As a result, the 
onset of democracy should lead to transfers of various forms in the case of adverse 
shocks and/or new investments in infrastructure that help the relatively poor.  Since these 
transfers and new infrastructure should help reduce the strength of the link between 
household consumption and household income for the median voters and the poor 
residents, we expect elections to increase consumption insurance for these rural residents. 
  In contrast, the increase in consumption insurance due to elections should be less 
pronounced for the rich than for the median and the poor residents. Past research has   8
shown that the rich tends to have more complete consumption insurance since they have 
access to many private means of dealing with income shocks such as borrowing, saving, 
and the sales of assets (Townsend, 1995).  Consumption insurance for rich residents is 
therefore unlikely to be an important issue for them, and they are likely to use their votes 
to push for other agenda that they care more about.  Moreover, since most villages are 
still relatively poor, the increases in village-wide transfers after the democracy likely 
would yield a much smaller impact on their consumption amounts relative to their 
income for the rich residents when compared with the non-rich residents.  As a result, the 
rich residents are expected to experience a smaller or no reduction in consumption 
insurance relative to the non-rich residents. 
  Indeed, several pieces of evidence are consistent with elections' effects in helping 
rural residents in general and the median voters and the poor in particular.  Using the 
same data set, Wang and Yao (2006) find that rural elections in China increase 
accountability to rural residents, increase the share of public expenditures in the village 
budget, reduce the share of administrative costs and income handed to township 
government, and reduces the amount of tax paid by village residents.  Since reducing tax 
burden is likely to benefit the poor and the median voters more than the rich, this aspect 
of the effects of elections would help the median and the poor to a greater extent.  In 
addition, Li, Xu and Yao (2006) find that rural elections reduce the amount of borrowing 
for villagers, lead to a higher likelihood of establishing a local healthcare plan, and 
ultimately reduce the negative impacts of a health shocks on farmers' incomes.  There can 
thus be several channels through which elections reduce the vulnerabilities of the median 
and the poor farmers: reducing tax burden, increasing public expenditure, and 
establishing local healthcare plans. 
 
III.  Data and Measurements   
  Our data come from two sources.  The first is the National Fixed-Point Survey 
(NFS) maintained by the Ministry of Agriculture of China.  NFS is a longitudinal survey 
of about 320 villages and 24,000 households distributed in all continental Chinese 
provinces. It started in the mid-1980s and the villages and households are surveyed every 
year. The survey adopts a stratified sampling approach. For each province, it first   9
randomly selects a number of counties, and then randomly selects a number of villages 
within each county. If a village is selected, a randomly selected number of households of 
the village are surveyed.  Because of the budget constraint of our research fund, the 
retrospective survey was only conducted in a sub-sample of the full NFS sample. In 
particular, we randomly select 48 villages in 8 provinces to conduct the retrospective 
survey. The eight provinces are Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hunan, Henan, Shanxi, Jilin, 
Sichuan, and Gansu, and are reasonably representative of the various regions in China. 
  The second source of our data is a retrospective survey conducted by the authors 
in the spring of 2003. This survey was conducted using the NFS sampling frame.
3  The 
survey was done in the same eight provinces.  As a result, 49 villages and 1428 
households remained in the survey.  Of the eight provinces, Henan, Hunan, Gansu, 
Shanxi and Sichuan are relatively poor, while Jilin, Guangdong and Zhejiang are 
significantly richer.  The average GDP per capita (in constant value of year 2002) in 1996 
is 9,513 Yuan for the richest province of Guangdong, and 2901 Yuan for the poorest 
province of Gansu. The farmers in the richest province are thus about three times richer 
than those in the poorest one in our sample.  Our sample therefore includes a wide range 
of provinces at different levels of economic development. 
One empirical issue is that, with the attrition of data the survey organization 
assigned the same ID for a household that was added to the sample to replace a lost 
household over time.  To make sure that the households with the same identification 
numbers (IDs) are indeed the same households in our retrospective survey, we used 
several criteria based on household characteristics (the size of the household, land area, 
and the age of the household head) to identify and match households. Consequently, in 
the eight provinces covered by our survey, 1,354 households remain in the sample.
4 The 
NFS has already provided information on village and household characteristics, so our 
supplemental survey only asked questions related to individual health history and village 
governance. The household data provided by the NFS cover the period 1987 to 2002, but 
do not have information for 1990, 1992, and 1994 when no surveys were conducted due 
                                                 
3   One drawback of the NFS is that it does not maintain a consistent indexing system for the 
households. To establish the panel structure, we had to use a set of household variables to match the same 
household across time. Ex post random checks showed that the match had very good accuracy. 
4   The reduction in sample size is likely to be random as no systematic attrition and change of 
households were reported in the NFS. As a result, our samples can be treated as a stratified random sample.   10
to budgetary problems. Among the 49 sample villages, the number of surveyed 
households per village ranges from 7 to 90, with a median of 35 households.  
  NFS includes detailed information on household income, consumption, and 
demographics, which allow us to test whether households have full consumption 
insurance.  The 2003 retrospective survey collected additional information on village 
characteristics including detailed information on the history of village elections.  Other 
information includes the number of surnames, the share of households with the most 
populous surnames, the timing of the passage of the election law in our sample 
provinces.
5  These village characteristics will be used to examine the endogeneity of the 
election dummy variable. 
  Consumption is measured as non-medical consumption per household member.
6  
Income per capita is constructed as net household income per household member, which 
in turn is computed as the total income subtracting operating expenses and transfers to 
other people.  Income growth was substantial over the period of 1987-2002. The average 
per-capita income in 2002 was 2.2 times of that in 1987,
7  which implies an average 
annual growth rate of 5.4%.  The asset holding of a rural household is measured as the 
year-end value of fixed assets per household member.  This variable has a quite large 
standard deviation—its coefficient of variation is 4.6.  All variables related to 
consumption, income and asset are measured in Yuan of constant value of year 2002. 
  Our sample period witnesses an important transition in village governance: from 
government-appointed local leaders to democratically-elected ones.
8  Village leaders used 
to be appointed by upper levels of government.  They were supposed to collect taxes and 
levy fees, implement family planning, fulfill grain procurement quota, and provide public 
goods and services (Lin et al., 2003).  Since the upper levels of governments place a 
higher value for the first three responsibilities (relative to public goods for village 
                                                 
5   Even though the election law is national in nature, each province also passes a law for the 
implementation specifics, and the timing may differ. The number of provinces that passed the provincial 
election law in our sample is: 2 in 1988, 5 in 1991, 6 in 1997, and 8 after 1998. 
6   The share of medical expenditure is relatively small; our empirical results do not hinge on whether 
we include it in the consumption variable or not. 
7   The average income in our sample is higher than the national average in 2002. NFS relies on 
household bookkeeping to collect data, so it oversamples larger and better-educated households when it 
first started in 1986 because these households were more able to maintain good bookkeeping. 
8   See Zhang et al. (2004) for detailed information on the implementation of village elections in 
Chinese villages.   11
residents), and village leaders were not accountable to local residents, village leaders had 
little or no incentive for providing public goods to village residents.  Instead, traditional 
village leaders would allocate their time and energy geared toward promotion into 
becoming officials of upper levels of government.   Starting from the mid-1980s, 
however, the central government began to experiment with village elections (O’Brien and 
Li, 2000).  After a few years of experimentation, the central government called for a 
widespread implementation in the early 1990s.  However, the implementation timing and 
details varied widely across and within regions. Figure 1 plots the share of villages with 
elected leaders in our sample.  The share started around 20 percent in 1987, rose steadily 
to roughly 70 percent in late 1990s, and ended up at 100 percent starting from year 2000.   
This trend is comparably with what was observed with the data in Zhang et al. (2004), 
which was based on 60 villages in Jiangsu province.
9  The variations are both across 
villages and times series.  Table 1 exhibits the time-series pattern of elections across 
provinces.  It clearly shows that provinces (and villages) differed significantly in the 
timing of implementing elections.  For instance, 100% of sample villages in Sichuan 
Province had elections by 1991, while only 0.3% of the villages in Guangdong Province 
had elections by 1995.  
 
IV. Empirical  Results 
  We now present estimates of specifications (2) and (3) respectively.  In our 
empirical implementation, we keep a household-year observation if none of the variables 
are missing.  In initial explorations we find that Δlnc has some significant outliers. To 
reduce the sensitivity of our results with respect to measurement errors, we replace the 
values of Δlnc in the top and the bottom 1 percents with the values at 99 and 1 
percentiles.
10  Since Election only vary at the village-year level, and our primary interest 
is to investigate the effects of elections, to avoid overstatement of estimation prevision 
we allow the error term for the household-year observation to be correlated within the 
village (Moulton, 1986).   
                                                 
9   In their sample, the percentage started at 35 percent in 1985 and stopped at 85 percent in 1999.   
10   We have also tried dropping the top and bottom 0.25%, 0.5%, and 1%, and the results are similar.   12
  The correlation coefficient between the percentage change of consumption, Δlnc, 
and the percentage change of income, Δlny, is 0.354, with a significance level of 0.000.  
The correlation coefficient is 0.367 for household-years without elections, and 0.349 for 
observations with elections, both statistically significant.  Thus elections are associated 
with better consumption insurance.  Table 2 reports the summary statistics and definitions 
of our dependent and independent variables.  On average, consumption growth is positive, 
at 2.8 percent.  Income per household member grows at a faster pace at 3.7 percent.  In 
our sample, roughly two thirds of village-years have elected leaders.  The typical village 
has 418 households.  
 
Base results  
Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (2) where the election dummy is not included.  
In the first three columns, we do not control for region-year dummies.
11  In column (1) 
we do not control for household demographic variables. In columns (2) and (3) we 
control for changes in the number of household members.  In columns (2) we also control 
for the composition of the household, while in column (3) we instead control for the 
differences in the composition of the household.  The contrast between columns (2) and 
(3) is aimed at checking the robustness of our results with respect to alternative 
specifications of household demographic structure.
12  In columns (4) to (6), we control 
for village-year dummies.  Since there could be risk pooling in a wider regional context, 
the cross section unit for risk pooling could therefore be provinces instead of villages.
13  
In columns (7) to (9), we thus control for province-year dummies to see whether and how 
our results on risk sharing are sensitive to the unit of the region.   
  Overall the estimates for b appear to be quite stable, in a tight neighborhood 
ranging from 0.32 to 0.35.  Moreover, the F-test invariably rejects the null hypothesis that 
                                                 
11   We have also tried regressing first-differenced consumption level on first-differenced income level.  
The qualitative results remain similar. For instance, the coefficient of income per household member 
remains statistically significant, with a magnitude of around 0.30 for the specification including village-
year dummies.  The log linear specification appears to be preferred since it leads to a higher R squared than 
the linear specification with the same degree of freedom.  Since residents differ so much in their income 
and consumption levels, it makes more intuitive sense to assume the log linear rather than the linear 
specification.    
12   In the literature and in informal discussions, some prefer the level and others prefer the difference. 
13   The villages tend to be in different counties, so using county as the cross sectional unit does not 
help much.   13
the region-year dummies are not significantly different from zero.  These findings imply 
that within-region risk sharing mechanisms are working to a certain extent, and that we 
can reject the hypothesis of full consumption insurance. Consumption growth of 
households is at least partly determined by aggregate shocks, and partly by household 
income shocks.  We have also found that the results remain similar if we use robust 
regression to minimize the effect of outliers (the results are not reported but are available 
upon request).  Note that the estimates of b are very similar whether we use village-year 
or province-year dummies.  This finding suggests that we can use province-year dummies 
to capture risk sharing at the aggregate level when we examine how elections affect b, the 
extent of risk sharing. This facilitates our empirical task a great deal since village-year 
dummies would be perfectly collinear with the election dummy, and using province-year 
dummies to control for aggregate shocks allows us to identify the effects of elections on 
consumption growth and consumption insurance. 
  The findings on other controls indicate that an increase in household sizes is 
associated with a slower consumption growth. Moreover, households with more old 
members (kids) tend to have slower (faster) consumption growth. In addition, households 
with an increase in the number of kids experience a slower consumption growth rate. 
Note that our key results on b are largely insensitive to whether we include the variables 
related to the household structure, and it does not matter whether we include the variables 
of the household structure in level or in difference.   We have also experimented with 
including other household controls such as the education levels of the household head 
and his spouse, and they do not have any explanatory power.  These education indicators 
are thus left out of our base specifications. 
 
Elections and Consumption Insurance   
Table 4 allows consumption insurance to depend on Election, the dummy variable of 
having village leaders elected. Before we present the results, it is perhaps useful to 
discuss the potential endogeneity of Election.  Some may worry that the timing of 
elections may be endogenous to consumption growth.  It is possible that villages with 
high (or low) consumption levels may be chosen to conduct elections earlier within a 
province, therefore the timing of elections may be endogenous with respect to the level of   14
consumption. However, it may no longer be the case once we take first difference in 
consumption.     
  We can formally test the exogeneity of Election for the consumption growth 
equation via the Hausman's test using some plausible instruments suggested by the 
literature.  While studying the effects of rural elections on fiscal behavior in China in 
roughly the same period, Zhang et. al (2004) suggests that the distribution of surnames 
within the village is a good source of identifying information.  Zhang et al. have done 
field studies and found that the timings of elections are related to civil conflicts within 
villages, while most conflicts in rural China are related to clashes between family clans.  
They conclude that population heterogeneity has predictive power for the occurrence of 
elections.   Besides what Zhang et al. propose, we also consider another source of 
information: the passage of the election law within a province.  The passage of the 
election law is at the discretion of the provincial government and should have nothing to 
do with household-level consumption growth.   
  Accordingly, the sources of the maintained exogenous instrumental variables for 
Election are the following: the dummy variable of passing provincial law for the election 
(provincial election law), the share of household heads in the village with the most 
populous surname, the logarithm of the number of surnames in the village, the dummy of 
having only one surname in the village, and the dummy of having two to four surnames 
in the village.  While by controlling the number of surnames in the village we have  
already controlled for the heterogeneity of family clans, the dummy variable of only one 
surname and that of having two to four surnames allow for some non-linearity.  Since 
there are no conflicts related to family clans when there is only one family clan, we need 
to control for this special case.  In addition, the dynamics for family clan conflicts may 
differ significantly for the case of a small number of family clans, and this explains why 
we also control for the dummy of having two to four surnames in the village.  When the 
number of family clans surpasses the threshold of five, the logarithm of the number of 
surnames should take care of the family-clan heterogeneity.     15
  All the instrument variables except province election law are time-invariant,
14 and 
cannot explain the timing of village elections.  However, if we assume that upon the 
passage of provincial election law the other time-invariant variables start to affect the 
chance of the village election, it makes sense to allow these variables to interact with 
provincial election law. In our empirical implementation, all the variables related to 
surnames are all interacted with provincial election law.  Since provincial election law is 
perfectly collinear with our control variables (i.e., province-year dummies), we cannot 
directly include it in our instruments.  However, its interactions with the variables related 
to the surname allow us to use the timing information contained in provincial election 
law to instrument Election.   
    Empirical  tests  suggest  that these instruments are indeed reasonable ones. To 
ensure that we have strong instruments, we have examined the first-stage regression, and 
these variables are jointly significant, with an F statistics of 86.7, far surpassing the 
threshold of 10 for strong instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995).
15  In the first 
stage regression, the share of the most populous surname is positive and significant for 
predicting the incidences of elections, the number of surnames is positive and significant, 
and the case of only one surname has an extra positive effect (up and above those being 
predicted by the logarithm of the number of surnames).  The Hausman's test yields a p-
value of 0.297, and the null hypothesis of exogenous Election thus cannot be rejected.   
We have also conducted the overidentifying restrictions test for the joint exogeneity of 
the instruments, and the p-value for the Hansen's J statistic is 0.331.  We therefore cannot 
reject that we have proper instruments.  Since the instruments are plausible and strong 
and they pass the over-identifying restrictions test, and we cannot reject the exogeneity of 
Election, we shall treat Election as exogenous in future regressions.  As a robustness 
check, we shall also report the results that treat Election as endogenous, and instrument 
them with the afore-mentioned instrumental variables.  Since in the case of exogenous 
Election, instrumental variable estimation is supposed to be less efficient than in the 
                                                 
14   While theoretically the distribution of names may differ over time, they change very slowly over 
time.  In our data, these variables come from ex post phone interviews with villages, and represent cross-
sectional data at the end of our sample period.   
15   All the test statistics are based on the specification in which we do not control for household 
structure.  The results based on the alternative specification in which we control for household structure are 
very similar.   16
ordinary least square estimation, we expect the estimates for Election and its interaction 
term with income growth to be less precisely estimated. 
  Another way to see if the results are sensitive to the endogeneity of Election is to 
examine whether the results are robust when we include only a subset of provinces in 
which the implementation of elections are more uniform. In this subsample, the election 
is less subject to selectivity based on village characteristics and household characteristics, 
and the estimated effects of elections on consumption insurance should therefore be less 
contaminated by selectivity bias.  Note that we do control for province-year dummies so 
selectivity at the aggregate level is already held constant. From Table 1, one can see that 
Jilin, Hunan, Guangdong, Sichuan and Zhejiang villages adopted the election in more 
uniform paces, while the other three provinces showed much more variations in the 
timing of adoption.  We thus also report the results using only the sub-sample of the five 
"quickly-adopting" provinces as mentioned above. 
  Table 4 reports the results.  Since the Hausman's test cannot reject the exogeneity 
of Election, columns (1) to (3) report the OLS results: column (1) does not control for 
variables related to household structure, while columns (2) and (3) control for either the 
levels of or the differences in the household structure variables.  The results are similar.  
The interaction term of Election  and income growth is negative, and close to being 
statistically significant.  In terms of magnitude, village elections reduce the sensitivity of 
consumption growth to household income growth by roughly 18%.   
  Columns (4) to (6) replicate the results with the subsample of quickly-adopting-
election sub-sample.  The qualitative results are again very similar.  Now the interaction 
term is statistically significant.  The drop in the sensitivity of consumption growth to 
income growth is now about 23%. 
  Table 5 reports the GMM estimates of how elections affect consumption 
insurance. The instruments for Election is as mentioned earlier, and those for Election 
times income growth are the interaction terms of income growth with those instruments.  
The overidentifying restrictions tests are all passed so that we have reasonable 
instruments. In the first three columns we control for province-year dummies, and in the 
second three columns we do not.  Again, we try various combinations of controls of 
household characteristics.  In all specifications, the reduction in b is between 14% to 18%,   17
very similar to what we find earlier with the OLS specification.  As expected, the results 
are less precisely estimated.    
Elections and Consumption Insurance: By Quartile of Asset Ownership 
Another hypothesis we posit is that elections should mainly help the poor and the median 
voters and not the rich in consumption insurance.  Table 6 confirms this hypothesis.  We 
run the regressions for the top and bottom quartiles, along with the middle two quartiles, 
and see if indeed the extent of reduction in b is greater for the non-rich subsample.  In the 
first three columns, we use the pooled sample, and in the second three columns, we use 
the quickly-adopting-election subsample.  Note that the sample size (when adding up the 
three columns' observations) has been reduced somewhat; the reason is due to the missing 
value for the classification variable, the household asset.  
  The hypothesis is invariably accepted in our now familiar configurations of 
specifications.  For the rich residents of the top quartile, elections do not help 
consumption insurance at all: the interaction term of Election  and  y ln Δ  is  never 
statistically or economically significant.  Yet for the poor quartile and the middle class 
quartiles, the interaction term is negative and largely statistically significant.  The 
estimated reduction in b is between 26% and 35%, and the middle class benefits similarly 
in the increase in consumption insurance as the poor. So the poor and the middle class 
achieve better consumption insurance from the implementation of elections.  Note that in 
the specification we control for changes in household characteristics.  We have also tried 
not controlling for them or controlling for the level of household characteristics, and the 
results remain very similar. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  Using a panel data set of Chinese rural households over an interesting period of 
16 years that cover important institutional changes, this paper examines whether the 
degree of consumption insurance is affected by elections, and how various income groups 
benefit differently.  We find that rural residents have been able to achieve better 
consumption insurance when the village leader is elected, perhaps because they are more 
accountable to the interests of local constituents.  Moreover, we find that it is the poor   18
and the middle class (but not the rich) who benefit in consumption insurance after 
elections. Our results appear to be quite robust in terms of variations in estimation 
methods and in specifications. 
  While the literature on rural consumption insurance is rich, our research suggests 
that the relationship between risks and institutions may still be a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  Our study suggests that institutions may play an important role in reducing the 
vulnerabilities of poor villagers, and that the poor's welfare may increase with proper 
governance.     19
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                             Table  1.  Share if villages with elected leaders 
 
  1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 
Shanxi  26 41 80 80 100 
Jilin  0  69  100 100 100 
Zhejiang  38 85 100  100  100 
Henan  50 75 75 100  100 
Hunan  32 83 100  100  100 
Guangdong  0.3 0.3 0.3 100  100 
Sichuan  30  100 100 100 100 
Gansu  26 50 67 100  100 
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                                                 Table  2.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Definitions  Obs  Mean  St.  Dev. 
Δlnc  
First difference in ln(consumption per household member). 
Consumption is measured in 2002 value.  13546  0.028  0.602 
Δlny  
First difference in ln(net income per household member).  Net 
income is measured in 2002 value.  13424 0.037  0.609 
Δlnn   First difference in ln(number of household member).  13552  -0.013  0.258 
lnNkid 
Logarithm of the number of kids (plus one). Kids are defined as 
those with ages 15 or lower.   19941 0.611  0.535 
lnNold  
Logarithm of the number of old (plus one). The old are defined as 
all household members with age 60 or above.  19941 0.285  0.412 
Election 
The dummy variable indicating that the head of the village is 
elected. 19670  0.663  0.473 
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Table 3. First-Difference Estimates of Consumption Insurance 
 
no control of region-year 
dummies 
control for village-year 
dummies 
control for province-year 
dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δ ln(income PC)  0.351 0.335 0.335 0.345 0.328 0.329 0.339 0.321 0.322 
  (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.036)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** 
Δ ln(number of HH     -0.244 -0.242    -0.233 -0.231    -0.248 -0.246 
    members)    (0.033)***  (0.033)***    (0.033)***  (0.033)***    (0.038)***  (0.038)*** 
ln(number of kids + 1)    0.010      0.007      0.006   
   (0.005)*     (0.004)      (0.005)   
ln(number of old + 1)    -0.035      -0.037      -0.036   
   (0.007)***    (0.006)***    (0.007)***  
Δ ln(number of kids + 1)     -0.042    -0.030    -0.032 
     (0.019)**     (0.019)     (0.021) 
Δ ln(number of old + 1)     -0.027    -0.036    -0.037 
     (0.037)    (0.035)    (0.029) 
village-year  dummies  no no no yes  yes  yes no no no 
province-year  dummies  no no no no no no yes  yes  yes 
P for F-test: joint  
significance of 



















Observations  13353 13347 13347 13353 13347 13347 13413 13347 13347 
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Note.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Statistical errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the village level. 
The dependent variable is  lnc Δ .  The coefficient of the intercept is not reported. 
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                           Table 4.  Consumption Insurance and Election 
 Pooled  sample  Quickly-adopting-election  sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ  ln(income  PC)  0.391 0.372 0.372 0.432 0.416 0.415 
  (0.044)*** (0.042)*** (0.043)*** (0.048)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
election  0.010 0.008 0.009 0.035 0.030 0.030 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
election * d ln(income PC)  -0.070  -0.068 -0.067 -0.098 -0.096 -0.095 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.052)*  (0.049)*  (0.049)* 
Δ ln(number of HH     -0.247  -0.246    -0.211  -0.211 
       members)    (0.033)***  (0.033)***    (0.033)***  (0.033)*** 
ln(number  of  kids  +  1)   0.006    0.003  
   (0.004)    (0.005)  
ln(number of old + 1)    -0.036      -0.033   
   (0.006)***    (0.007)***  
Δ ln(number of kids + 1)      -0.034      -0.047 
     (0.018)*     (0.023)* 
Δ ln(number of old + 1)      -0.044      -0.024 
     (0.036)     (0.044) 
Province-year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  13111 13105 13105  9590  9590  9590 
R-squared  0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 
 
Note. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the village level. 
The dependent variable is  lnc Δ . 
The intercept is not reported. 
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                           Table 5.  Consumption Insurance and Election: GMM Estimates 
 
Controlling for province-year 
dummies 
Not controlling for province-year 
dummies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
election -0.169  -0.125  -0.138 -0.009 -0.006 -0.011 
  (0.135) (0.134) (0.133) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
election * Δ  ln(income  PC) -0.049 -0.046 -0.046 -0.074 -0.071 -0.071 
 (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)*  (0.038)*  (0.038)* 
Δ  ln(income  PC)  0.374 0.354 0.354 0.404 0.385 0.386 
 (0.031)***  (0.031)***  (0.031)***  (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
Δ ln(number of HH     -0.250  -0.249    -0.246  -0.244 
         members)    (0.025)***  (0.025)***    (0.025)***  (0.025)*** 
ln(number of kids + 1)    0.009      0.012   
   (0.010)    (0.009)  
ln(number  of  old  +  1)   -0.036    -0.036  
   (0.012)***    (0.012)***  
Δ ln(number of kids + 1)      -0.032      -0.046 
     (0.023)     (0.023)** 
Δ ln(number of old + 1)      -0.056      -0.044 
     (0.034)     (0.035) 
Control for province-year 
dummies yes  yes  yes  no  no  no 
Observations  12932 12926 12926 12932 12926 12926 
p value for Hansen's J 
statistics  0.185 0.117 0.144 0.360 0.318 0.304 
Note. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the village level. 
The dependent variable is  lnc Δ . 
The intercept is not reported. 
The instruments for election are provincial election law times each of the following variables: the share of 
the surname that accounts for the most families in the village, logarithm of the number of surnames in the 
village, the dummy variable of only one surname in the village, of two to four surnames in the family.  The 
instruments for election * Δ ln(income PC) is Δ ln(income PC) times all the afore-mentioned instruments.   28

























Δ ln(number of HH members)  -0.168  -0.248  -0.332  -0.115  -0.225  -0.286 
 (0.055)***  (0.057)***  (0.064)*** (0.068)* (0.060)***  (0.063)*** 
Δ ln(number of kids + 1)  0.014 -0.044 -0.028 -0.007 -0.064 -0.028 
  (0.051) (0.033) (0.073) (0.070)  (0.036)*  (0.080) 
Δ ln(number of old + 1)  -0.006 0.018 -0.226 0.019 0.028 -0.229 
  (0.074) (0.064)  (0.103)**  (0.073) (0.069)  (0.132)* 
Δ  ln(income  PC)  0.451 0.428 0.267 0.510 0.466 0.288 
 (0.075)***  (0.058)***  (0.039)***  (0.106)*** (0.056)*** (0.038)*** 
election * Δ  ln(income  PC)  -0.117 -0.123 -0.004 -0.170 -0.164 -0.002 
  (0.072) (0.062)* (0.044) (0.098)* (0.061)***  (0.053) 
election  -0.017 -0.002 0.085 0.215 -0.003 0.008 
  (0.050) (0.026) (0.061) (0.130) (0.033) (0.112) 
Observations  2616 5064 2671 1622 4442 2149 
R-squared  0.19 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.15 
Note. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
Standard errors allow clustering at the village level. 
The dependent variable is Δlnc. 
The intercept is not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
  